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ABSTRACT
Whistle-blowing is usually regarded as a way to identify abuse and
wrongdoing on the part of governments and corporations. In this
paper we show how, at a micro level, whistle-blowing can be used
as a designer tool to prevent opportunistic behavior, that takes the
form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple
hierarchical structure.
We focus on a three-layered principal–supervisor–agent structure
and show how the principal can use whistle-blowing as a way
to prevent the supervisor and the agent from colluding to the
detriment of the principal.
To understand our mechanism we need to explicitly define the
penalty a party has to incur for walking away from a collusive
agreement. Rewarding whistle-blowing creates incentives for the
uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report
to the principal that collusion took place. This threat clearly
reduces the informed party’s incentive to participate in side deals.
It also serves as a potential blackmail threat between the colluding
parties. However, careful use of whistle-blowing allows the principal
to eliminate opportunities for blackmail.
Keywords: Collusion; blackmail; whistle-blowing; organizations; mechanism
design; communication; opportunistic behavior
Whistle-blowing is an important phenomenon both in public life and in the
corporate world. High profile whistle-blowers such as Edward Snowden for
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the National Security Agency, Bradley Manning for the US Army and M.N.
Vijayakumar for the Indian Administrative Service have left a lasting and
sometimes controversial impression on public opinion about the power of
whistle-blowing and its disciplinary role within public and corporate life. In
all these cases whistle-blowing is understood as the disclosure (in the public
interest) of an illegal or damaging practice to the press or other media platforms
in the name of the public interest. This usually leads to the indictment of
the organization that the whistle-blower is working for.1 In this paper we
explore a very different role for whistle-blowing. We explore how rewarding
whistle-blowing can be used as a mechanism design tool to prevent detrimental
or unwanted opportunistic behavior such as collusion or blackmail within an
organization. Indeed, in the British Standards’ Whistleblowing Arrangements
Code of Practice (2008) it is stated that “. . . an organisation where the value
of open whistleblowing is recognised will be able to deter wrongdoing”. Our
findings should promote the safeguarding of whistle-blowing practises: no
wrongdoing should ever occur when public organizations rationally anticipate
their own malpractices will reach the public eye.
In the classical paper on Congress’ oversight responsibilities, McCubbins
and Schwartz (1984) argue that there is one form of oversight that is usually
overlooked precisely because of its passive role. The authors assert that
Congress can police-patrol executive agencies or can also fire-alarm oversight
by establishing a set of criteria the agency should comply with while allowing
interested parties to blow the whistle when they observe any wrongdoing.
In this paper we analyze in detail the interaction between both oversight
capabilities and show how Congress and ultimately the Voter (either of them
can be interpreted as the principal in our model) can design contracts so as
to avoid any wrongdoing. More specifically, we are interested in situations
in which agencies (the supervisor in our model) might be colluding with a
regulated company (the agent in our model) to the detriment of the public
interest.2 Agencies gather information on the firms they regulate yet these
regulated firms would sometimes prefer this information being concealed so as
to avoid tighter regulation. Colluding behavior between agencies and regulated
firms (to the detriment of the public interest) can be avoided at no cost by
comments and suggestions of Philippe Aghion, Richard Arnott, Giuseppe Bertola, Sandro
Brusco, Francesca Cornelli, Donald Cox, Mathias Dewatripont, Peter Diamond, Antoine
Faure-Grimaud, Franklin M. Fisher, Oliver Hart, Andrea Ichino, Jean-Jacques Laffont,
David Martimort, John Moore, Patrick Rey, Lars Stole, Jean Tirole, Miguel Villas-Boas,
Oved Yosha and of seminar participants at numerous institutions during the exceedingly
long gestation of this research project.
1The literature on whistle-blowing is vast, see Miceli et al. (2008) for a complete overview
of the recent developments in multiple disciplines on the issue.
2When the Libor fixing scandal became public in 2012, there were indications that the
regulators (the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority) might not have
been free of guilt in Barclays’ behavior. Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration was
supposedly working together with AdvaMed (an association of medical companies) on the
medical device provisions in the 21st Century Cures Act.
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appropriately rewarding whistle-blowing (a type of fire-alarm oversight). This
mechanism is costless to the public because anticipating the possibility of
whistle-blowing prevents collusion or blackmailing from occurring in the first
place.
The possibility of collusion between supervisors and agents is a well-known
phenomenon. For example, De La O and Martel Garcia (2015) analyze the
Mexican Federal government’s (our principal) oversight of municipalities with
local or state auditors. These auditors (our supervisor) have a mandate to
audit the use of federal resources in the hands of municipal authorities (our
agent). Local auditors are seen as more effective due to their access to local
information yet they are also seen more prone to political pressures or collusive
agreements.
The key idea of our model is very simple. Consider a stylized three-layered
hierarchical structure: a principal, a supervisor and an agent. Suppose that
the agent has private information on his productive ability and the supervisor
only observes an imperfect signal of such ability. The principal can elicit the
information from the supervisor but by doing so he introduces the possibility
of collusion between the supervisor and the agent: an agent whose ability is
higher than a certain value can extract larger rents when the principal believes
he is a low type. However, to reach a collusive agreement the agent and the
supervisor need to communicate and define the terms of the agreement. In
so doing, the supervisor might become more informed about the productivity
of the agent and the principal can reward the supervisor for leaking such
information. If this is the case, the agent will refuse to participate in the
collusive bargaining process to avoid losing the informational rent promised by
the principal and collusion will be prevented. In the mechanism we present,
the principal transfers the informational rent from the agent to the supervisor
if the latter reports the information revealed during collusion or, equivalently,
blows the whistle and reports that collusion took place. In so doing, the
principal costlessly prevents harmful collusion.
The supervisor is able to exploit this additional information revealed
during collusion only if she can breach the collusive agreement even if at a
cost. In what follows we advance the existing literature by explicitly modeling
the enforceability of collusion, in particular the cost an individual incurs by
breaching a collusive agreement. The principal is then able to prevent collusion
by introducing in the contract to the supervisor, a clause that compensates
the supervisor for the cost incurred when breaching the collusive agreement.
Notice that since the final outcome is such that the agent refuses to participate
in collusion, this clause never applies in equilibrium and hence collusion is
prevented at zero cost to the principal.
Allowing the supervisor to report that collusion took place, however, comes
at a cost. It creates the opportunity for the supervisor to blackmail the agent
by threatening to blow the whistle even in the absence of any collusion unless
the agent pays part of his informational rent to the supervisor. We show that
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whistle-blowing once again can solve this problem. Allowing the agent to
report the supervisor’s threat to the principal is enough to prevent blackmail
in equilibrium. Moreover, if rewards for whistle-blowing are carefully chosen
the agent’s option to blow the whistle does not introduce further blackmail
opportunities on the part of the agent.
1 Related Literature
Our analysis is closely related to the literature on collusion pioneered by
Tirole (1986). This literature has depicted the problem as a costly one. It has
modeled collusion as a fully enforceable side contract ignoring the possibility
for the principal to induce one of the colluding parties to breach the side
contract and report to the principal that collusion took place. This implies
that the opportunity of collusion comes at a cost to the remaining parties to
the contract (Faure-Grimaud et al., 2003; Laffont and Martimort, 1997; Tirole,
1986).
While the early literature on collusion has analyzed collusion under hard
or verifiable information,3 the more recent literature has considered collusion-
proof mechanisms in the presence of soft or unverifiable information (Laffont
and Martimort 1997, 1999, 2000; Faure-Grimaud et al. 1999, 2000, 2001,
2003). The last four papers are the closest to ours. They consider an incentive
contract involving a principal, a supervisor, and an agent and allow parties to
set up fully enforceable collusive side contracts. They show that the collusion-
proof principle (Laffont and Martimort, 1997) holds in this environment. The
optimal mechanism is equivalent to a mechanism that in equilibrium does not
allow the parties of the contract to engage in collusion. In other words, the
optimal contract is the solution to the principal’s payoff maximization problem,
provided that supervisor and agent are not involved in collusion (as well as
the standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints).
In addition, Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) show that the equivalence principle
holds, and that delegation, when interpreted as an increase in the discretionary
power of members of the organization, is a way to implement the optimal
collusion-proof mechanism.
The approach we present here fits into their framework, and both the
collusion-proof principle and the equivalence principle apply. In other words,
the optimal mechanism we construct is such that the agent and the supervisor
do not engage in collusion and an increase in the parties’ discretionary power
is a way to implement such a mechanism. However, in contrast to these papers,
in our case the principal can always avoid collusion at no cost. We differ
from these papers in that we explicitly model the possibility of breaching
3See for example Kofman and Lawarrée(1993; 1996).
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side contracts. We then allow the mechanism designer or principal to offer
a mechanism that compensates the uninformed party for breaching the side
deal and reporting the existence of the side deal to the principal.4 In other
words, we enlarge the message space of both the supervisor and the agent in
the general mechanism that the principal offers them. When collusion takes
place under asymmetric information, these enlarged message spaces serve the
role of preventing any collusion and blackmail on the equilibrium path.
A number of papers have explicitly considered the effect of delegation on
parties’ incentives to engage in collusive agreements. Baliga and Sjöström
(1998) have explored the effect of delegation in a moral hazard setting in
the presence of colluding parties’ limited liability. They identify the optimal
delegation mechanism that achieves the outcome that is optimal in the absence
of collusion.5 This parallels our findings yet we do not rely on limited liability
but rather on the colluding parties’ option to breach the side contract at a cost.
Che and Kim (2006) and Celik (2009) both analyze delegation in the
presence of collusion in a hidden information framework. Both papers ask
whether delegation can achieve the same outcome that is optimal in the absence
of collusion. While Che and Kim (2006) reach a positive answer in a very
general framework, both in terms of the technology and the number of parties
involved in collusion, possibly excluding some of the parties from the side
deal, they do impose restrictions on the correlation between the colluding
parties’ information structure. Celik (2009), on the other hand, focuses on an
organizational and informational structure similar to the one we consider here.
He shows that delegation is not necessarily an optimal mechanism. In contrast
to these papers, the mechanism we suggest provides the colluding parties with
the incentive to breach the side contract and exploit the information they learn
during collusion to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the other parties.
This is the reason why in our framework increasing discretion is optimal.6
4In this respect our approach is similar to the augmented revelation mechanisms (Ma
et al., 1988; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1990) that allow a mechanism designer (the
principal) to prevent strategic coordination — as opposed to collusion — among agents. See
also Demsky and Sappington (1989) for a hierarchical model where coordination between the
supervisor and the agent is a concern that needs to be addressed by the optimal mechanism
selected by the principal.
5See also Kessler (2000) for a related point.
6Quesada (2005) explicitly models the informed principal problem that may arise when
collusion takes place under asymmetric information. This occurs when the party offering
the side contract has private information not available to the other party. In our context
collusion does not lead to an informed principal situation for two competing reasons. The
supervisors and the agent’s information structures are nested: the supervisor knows less
than the agent. We follow Laffont and Martimort (1997) and model collusion in a way that
is agnostic on the extensive form of the collusion game. In other words, our results do not
rely on the identity of the (possibly informed) principal in the side contract or on how the
collusive negotiation is structured.
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The literature on whistle-blowing has mainly focused on its effects on
antitrust policy and crime prevention.7 This literature has identified the
optimal leniency program that may destabilize cartels or criminal organizations
by identifying the optimal amount of leniency that destroys the trust of the
repeated (cartel) relationship (Motta and Polo, 2003; Spagnolo, 2004) or
the optimal rewards to employees for blowing the whistle to authorities on
the cartel’s existence (Aubert et al., 2006). More recently, Ting (2008) shows
that the informational advantages of whistle-blowing might be outweighed
by the costs of employees exerting less effort. In a related paper, Beim et al.
(2014) show that too much whistle-blowing decreases the informativeness of
such disclosure and might yield more wrongdoing in the first place. Relatedly,
Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2009) analyze the managerial choice of whistle-
blowing practises for providing incentives to report violations and committing
to fix such violations internally when they are privately reported. We build on
this literature by focusing on whistle-blowing as a mechanism design tool of the
principal and explicitly addressing the effects that rewarding whistle-blowing
has on increasing the supervisor’s opportunity to blackmail the agent.
Finally, there is a recent literature that focuses on the interplay of collusion,
blackmail and whistle-blowing. Khalil et al. (2010) explore the close relation-
ship between bribery and extortion. They show that in the presence of soft
information, it is optimal to allow bribery and extortion to occur in equilibrium
even if it is feasible to deter both. The reason for this is that in their paper
the coalition incentive constraints are interlinked. The key difference with our
analysis is the use of whistle-blowing as the tool that allows the principal to pre-
vent both collusion and blackmail (bribery and extortion in their terminology)
at no cost.8 Leppamaki (1997, Ch. 3) also considers explicitly the interplay
of whistle-blowing and blackmail in a contractual setting. While Leppamaki
(1997, Ch. 3) analyzes blackmail in an incomplete-contract dynamic framework,
in what follows we solve for the principal’s static mechanism design problem.
2 The Model
2.1 The Parties
We model a simple three-level hierarchy. The top of the hierarchy is the
residual claimant of profits: the principal (P ). The bottom layer is the only
level that actually produces any output: the agent (A). The intermediate level
consists of a supervisor (S), who is capable of collecting information about the
7See Spagnolo (2008) for an extended survey of the effects of whistle-blowing on antitrust
policy, and Gambetta and Reuter (1995) for its effects on prosecuting organized crime.
8See also Hindriks et al. (1999) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001) for an analysis of both
corruption and extortion in a taxation and law enforcement setting, respectively.
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agent’s relevant characteristics. Following our example in the Introduction,
one could think of the principal as being Congress; the supervisor as being a
regulatory agency that gathers information on the industry’s activities; and
the agent as being a regulated firm whose activities are heavily influenced by
the legislation Congress puts in place.
The agent is the productive unit of the hierarchy. He is endowed with a
productivity parameter θA, θA ∈ ΘA ≡ {θA1 , θA2 }, θA2 > θA1 . He may or may
not exert a productive effort eA ∈ R, and both effort and productivity will
generate an output x according to the following simple technology:
x = θA + eA (1)
The agent is assumed to be risk neutral in income. His utility function is
linear in income and strictly concave in effort. Disutility of effort is expressed,
in monetary terms, by d(eA), where d′(·) > 0, d′′(·) > 0, d′′′(·) > 0, for all
eA > 0; d(0) = d′(0) = 0, d(eA) = 0, for all eA < 0.9 The agent’s objective
function is then: w − d(eA); his reservation wage is w¯.
The supervisor has a monitoring role. She does not contribute directly to
the productive process, but just provides information. If requested, she can
supply the information to the principal. This is modeled by assuming that the
supervisor observes a noisy signal, θS ∈ ΘS ≡ {θS1 , θS2 }, θS2 > θS1 , of the agent’s
productivity parameter θA. Arguably, the agency that regulates a particular
industry will never have perfect information on this industry’s characteristics.
This signal is soft or unverifiable information, in the sense that an outside
party — the principal in particular — has no way to verify the real value of
the signal besides asking the supervisor for a report and inducing, through
incentives, truthful revelation. This signal is observed by the supervisor at no
cost.10
The supervisor is risk averse. Her utility function V (s) is strictly concave
in the salary s: V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0. The supervisor has an outside option
with a reservation salary s¯.
The principal is risk neutral, and is the residual claimant of the agent’s
actions.
9Notice that while this is a model with both moral hazard and adverse selection the
technological assumption, Equation (1), implies that for all intents and purposes this is
a pure adverse selection framework (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, Ch. 7). The role of
negative effort is to keep things simple and allow the high productivity agent to mimic the
low productivity agent. The assumption on the third derivative of the disutility function
assures concavity of the optimization problems considered later.
10In principle, the supervisor might have to spend a costly effort to get a strictly
informative signal, as in Demsky and Sappington (1989). However, such generalization does
not add much to the analysis of collusion, while considerably complicating the notation and
the presentation of the model.
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2.2 The Information Structure
The principal is the least informed party. His information set includes only
the final levels of output x. The supervisor costlessly observes the noisy signal
θS of the agent’s productivity θA, and observes x. Finally, the agent has the
best information structure: he knows θA, and can observe both the signal θS
and x.11 We take x to be the only verifiable information of the model, while
θA is observable only to the agent and θS is observable to both the agent and
the supervisor.
The agent’s productivity θA and the supervisor’s signal θS are positively,
but imperfectly, correlated. Let:
qi = Pr{θS = θS1 | θA = θAi } i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
That is, q1 is the probability that the signal θS1 is correct and q2 is the
probability that the same signal is not correct. We take θS to be a strictly
but not fully informative signal of θA:
0 < q2 <
1
2
< q1 < 1 (3)
2.3 The Timing and Solution Concept
Before contracting, θA and θS are determined by nature and are the agent’s
and the supervisor’s private information. As mentioned above the supervisor
only observes the realization of θS while the agent observes the realizations of
both θS and θA. The principal’s beliefs about θA and θS are then characterized
by the prior pi = Pr {θA = θA1 } and the conditional distribution qi as in
Equation (2), while the supervisor’s beliefs, after observing the realization
of θS , are:
p1 = Pr{θA = θA1 | θS = θS1 } =
q1pi
q1pi + q2(1− pi)
p2 = Pr{θA = θA1 | θS = θS2 } =
(1− q1)pi
(1− q1)pi + (1− q2)(1− pi)
(4)
Negotiations take place in which the principal is assumed to have all the
bargaining power. He proposes a take-it-or-leave-it contractual offer C =
(CA, CS) to both the agent and the supervisor, which specifies a schedule of
compensations for them contingent on output and on the supervisor’s report.
Supervisor and agent simultaneously and independently decide whether to
accept or reject the principal’s offer. If the agent rejects the offer, negotiation
with both parties ends and the game ends. If the supervisor rejects the offer,
11The fact that A observes θS is clearly a simplifying assumption. It provides us a simple
framework in which collusion may take place between the agent and the supervisor.
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negotiation proceeds involving only the agent. The game then becomes a
standard two-tier principal–agent problem.12 If the principal wishes, he can
make degenerate offers to the supervisor, which amount to a decision on his
part to negotiate only with the agent. If both supervisor and agent accept the
offer a contract is signed.
After the contract is signed, the collusive negotiation between the supervisor
and the agent takes place. We provide below a general characterization of this
negotiation.
At a predetermined time — between the initial contracting date and the
date at which the agent produces output x — the supervisor produces a
report r of her observed signal that becomes public information.13 The agent
then exerts his productive effort, the outcome of production becomes publicly
observable and remunerations are paid according to the contract C.14 We
assume that all of this structure — summarized in the figure below — is
common knowledge to all the parties.
-r r r r rA learns θA
S and A
learn θS Contract
Collusion
between
S and A S reports r r
A chooses eA
Output produced
Transfers
2.4 A World Without Collusion or Blackmail
The revelation principle implies that, without loss of generality, we can restrict
attention to a revelation game where both agent and supervisor reveal their
information to the principal, who can then use this information subject to
the usual incentive constraints. These incentives constraints require that the
agent and supervisor reveal their information truthfully, given the contracts
offered by the principal (that is, the remunerations and the effort level of the
agent).15 In the revelation game the supervisor’s strategy space is the set of
all possible mappings from the signal space ΘS into her message space ΘS .
12Alternatively, the principal could make a unique offer to the agent that specifies a
contractual arrangement, if the supervisor accepts the principal’s offer and a different
arrangement if the supervisor rejects the principal’s offer; nothing would change.
13In principle, it might be of use for the principal to ask the agent, as well as the
supervisor, to report the signal θS . This cannot improve the Principal’s utility, given that
under our optimal mechanism collusion will be avoided at zero cost.
14We take the timing of the supervisor’s report as exogenously given. This is a simplifying
assumption. However, our main result — the fact that collusion can be prevented at no
additional costs — suggests a reason why the principal might want to specify the timing we
analyze. See Felli (1990, Ch. 2, Sec. 6) for a discussion of the case in which the timing of
the supervisor’s report is endogenous.
15See Chapter 7 of Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a detailed discussion on how in our
case the adverse selection and moral hazard problem simplify to a pure adverse selection
problem using the revelation principle.
288 Felli and Hortala-Vallve
Similarly, the agent’s strategy space is the set of all possible mappings from
the space of the productivity parameters ΘA into the message space ΘA. The
mechanism the principal offers specifies a salary for the supervisor, a wage for
the agent, and an output as functions of the agent’s and supervisor’s reports:
C = [s(θˆA, θˆS), w(θˆA, θˆS), x(θˆA, θˆS)]
If only the agent accepts the principal’s offer then the mechanism boils
down to a standard principal–agent problem.16
In what follows we focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this
game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991): a contract (remunerations and effort level
in each state of the world), a revelation mapping for both the agent and the
supervisor (a mapping from their private information to the message revealed
to the principal) and a belief system by the principal such that all strategies are
sequentially rational given the belief system and the belief system is consistent,
wherever possible, given the strategy profile.
When there is no scope for collusion, both agent and supervisor are honest
in the sense that neither of them engage in collusion or blackmail, our simple
structure allows the risk neutral principal to pay a constant salary to the risk
averse supervisor
s(θˆSi , θˆ
A
j ) = s¯ ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2} (5)
and induce her to report the truth.17
The principal inherits, in this way, the information of the supervisor and
can sign a contract with the agent that induces him to report the truth. This
incentive contract is contingent on the information θˆS that the supervisor
reports as well as the agent’s report θˆA. The principal’s optimization problem
is then subject to the agent’s incentive and participation constraints:
max
{xij ,wij}
pi [q1 (x11 − w11) + (1− q1) (x12 − w12)]
+ (1− pi) [q2 (x21 − w21) + (1− q2) (x22 − w22)]
s.t. w2j − d(x2j − θA2 ) ≥ w1j − d(x1j − θA2 ) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}
w1j − d(x1j − θA1 ) ≥ w¯ ∀j ∈ {1, 2}
(6)
where xij = x(θˆAi , θˆSj ) and wij = w(θˆAi , θˆSj ) for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every j ∈
{1, 2}. Problem (6) is standard. The principal’s expected profit is maximized
16In this case the optimal mechanism is [w(θˆA), x(θˆA)].
17We assume through the analysis that in case of indifference each party behaves in the
best possible way for the principal. This tie-breaking rule is used to avoid multiple equilibria
in the subgame played by the supervisor and the agent that arises when both parties
are indifferent between their actions. The same result could be obtained by augmenting
the honest mechanism described in this section, as in Ma et al. (1988), using nuisance
strategies that allow the principal to induce the supervisor and the agent to coordinate on
the equilibrium that the principal desires.
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraints for the high productivity
agent and the individual rationality constraints for the low productivity agent.
We omit individual rationality constraint for the high productivity agent and
incentive compatibility constraint for the low productivity agent since, as easily
shown, these constraints are not binding in equilibrium.
From Problem (6) we obtain:
x21 = x22 = x2 > x11 > x12 (7)
w21 − d(x2 − θA2 ) > w22 − d(x2 − θA2 ) > w¯ (8)
w11 − d(x11 − θA1 ) = w12 − d(x12 − θA1 ) = w¯ (9)
w21 − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w11 − d(x11 − θA2 ) (10)
w22 − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w12 − d(x12 − θA2 ) (11)
These conditions, together with Equation (5), fully characterize what we here
label the optimal honest contract.
The following Proposition 1 highlights the key feature of the honest contract
relevant for our analysis of collusion.18
Proposition 1. The premium paid in equilibrium to the high productivity
agent is higher if the supervisor reports θˆS1 rather than θˆS2 : w21 > w22.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The principal’s costs of inducing
a high productivity agent to separate himself from a low productivity agent are
of two types: a premium, in utility terms, for the high productivity agent and
an inefficient effort (output) level that the low productivity agent is required
to produce.19 Whenever the supervisor tells the principal that she thinks the
agent has low productivity — that is she has observed a low signal θS1 — the
principal updates his prior distribution increasing the probability that the
agent has a low productivity θA1 . This increases, in expected terms, the costs of
having the low productivity agent produce an inefficient level of output, while
reducing, in expected terms, the costs of a premium for the high productivity
agent. Of course, the situation is symmetric and opposite whenever the
supervisor reports to the principal a high signal θS2 . Therefore, the principal,
in equilibrium, trades-off these two costs and offers a higher premium to the
high productivity agent, if the supervisor’s report is low, than if it is high —
Proposition 1 and Equation (8) — and requires the low productivity agent
to exert a higher effort, if the supervisor’s report is low, than if it is high —
Equation (7).
A final question is whether in this world a principal would want to hire a
supervisor in the first place. The answer depends on the reservation salary of
18For ease of exposition all proofs are presented in the Appendix.
19Inefficiency is defined here with respect to an hypothetical first best, obtained in the
case the principal observes perfectly the productivity or the effort of the agent.
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the supervisor s¯. If the constant salary paid to the supervisor does not exceed
the principal’s gains generated by the availability of the signal θS the principal
strictly prefers to hire a supervisor.20
3 The Possibility of Collusion
3.1 The Collusive Contract
In our setup collusion takes place between two asymmetrically informed parties:
the agent and the supervisor. Therefore, in principle it is possible that during
the collusion negotiation the uninformed party, the supervisor, learns the
private information of the informed party, the agent. Depending on the
extensive form of the collusion negotiation this revelation of information might
occur before the uninformed party commits to the collusive agreement or after
this occurs. The implications of this timing differ depending on how enforceable
the collusion agreement is: whether the uninformed party can walk away from
collusion and what penalties for breach she is required to pay if she does. In
modeling collusion we want to specify a general model that encompasses this
additional source of information for the supervisor and allows her to walk away
from the collusive agreement, possibly at a cost.
The key assumption of our model is that negotiation of the collusive contract
takes place between asymmetrically informed parties. This typically leads to
multiple equilibria. What matters for our analysis is whether these equilibria
separate the two types of agent during the collusion subgame. Indeed, all
separating equilibria reveal the type of the agent to the supervisor hence the
information of the supervisor improves.
In what follows we do not specify an extensive form for the collusion
negotiation game.21 Instead we follow Laffont and Martimort (1997) and
assume the existence of a collusion designer. The colluding parties report their
private information to the collusion designer. In our setup only the informed
party, the agent, reports his private information, we denote this report θ˜Aj ,
j ∈ {1, 2}. The designer then assigns to the colluding parties an allocation of
surplus through the transfer that the agent makes to the supervisor β(θ˜Aj ),
j ∈ {1, 2}, a given report θˆS(θ˜Aj ), j ∈ {1, 2}, that the supervisor makes to the
20 The proof that an additional strictly informative signal generates a positive gain to the
principal goes as follows. The standard two-tier principal–agent optimization problem can
always be written in the form of Problem (6) adding the two constraints xih = xik, ∀h 6= k,
h, k ∈ {1, 2}. These two constraints turn out to be binding at the optimum. Equation (7)
shows that this is not true whenever the information reported by the supervisor is available.
Thus, the principal is strictly better off in the latter case.
21See Felli (1990, Ch. 1) for a closely related model where collusion negotiation proceeds
according to a specific extensive form: a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the agent to the
supervisor.
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principal and a report θˆA(θ˜Aj ), j ∈ {1, 2} that the agent makes to the principal
depending on the agent’s report θ˜Aj to the collusion designer. By the revelation
principle, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to equilibria of the
collusion subgame where the agent reports the truth to the collusion designer,
θ˜Aj = θ
A
j : reports are incentive compatible. If equilibrium transfers are such
that β(θA1 ) 6= β(θA2 ) then the equilibrium of the collusion game is a separating
one and the supervisor learns the agent’s private information in the collusion
subgame. Finally, collusion is a voluntary agreement, hence both parties will
agree to participate in the collusion contract only if the allocation induced
by the collusive agreement is individually rational. In our environment this
implies that the allocation induced by the collusion game has to be strictly
better than the allocation induced by the contract offered by the principal if
the parties decide not to participate in collusion.22
The enforceability of a side contract between two parties is an open issue
in the literature on collusion. Often a long-term relationship or a reputational
argument is mentioned, in the background, to justify the enforceability of
a side contract.23 In our analysis we use a different approach. We assume
that there is an exogenously given penalty for breach, denoted κ(κ ≥ 0), that
a party to collusion has to pay to walk out of the collusive agreement. We
also assume that a percentage, α(α ∈ [0, 1]), of this penalty is received by
the counterpart in the collusive agreement. In other words, in the case of
breach of the collusive agreement the payoff to the party breaching the side
deal decreases by the amount κ while the payoff to the other party of the deal
increases by the amount ακ.
The existing literature has overlooked the principal’s ability to prevent
collusion by inducing parties to breach their collusive agreement. The difference
between the penalty to the party breaching the collusion contract κ and the
transfer to the other party ακ is meant to capture the fact that most of the cost
associated with breaching a side deal is associated with a loss of reputation and
future opportunities. This implies that the cost cannot be easily transferred
to one’s counterpart in collusion. In other words, our general specification
encompasses the situation in which only the supervisor incurs a loss when
breaching the collusive contract (α = 0). Alternatively, our setup is also robust
to considering situations in which the supervisor can walk away from the
collusive contract just before it is signed (that is, the cost for breaching the
collusive contract is nil, κ = 0).
The optimal mechanism we derive below works independently of the size of
κ, this is meant to capture the fact that the loss in reputation associated with
22Recall our (standard) assumption that when indifferent the agent or the supervisor
behaves in the way the principal wants them to behave. In other words, if indifferent neither
party participates in collusion.
23See Aghion and Caillaud (1988) for a paper that explicitly analyzes this long-term
relationship.
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the breach may well exceed the financial benefits of the side deal. However,
we need the precise value of κ to be common knowledge to all parties. If the
principal is not perfectly informed of the nature of the collusive contract and
of the penalties associated with its breach, a further level of complexity is
added to the corresponding mechanism design problem. We leave the analysis
of this setting to further research while noting that in our setting it would be
sufficient that the principal knows the upper bound of κ for all of our results
to hold true.
3.2 Strongly Collusion-Proof Contracts
As mentioned above, in our setting collusive negotiation takes place between
asymmetrically informed parties. This implies that in general the equilibrium
outcome of the collusive game is not unique. Hence, the principal’s objectives
when facing the collusion problem are not at all obvious.
A possible objective might be for the principal to offer a contract to the
supervisor and the agent such that when they get involved in the collusion
game there exists at least one equilibrium of such a game in which no collusive
agreement is enforced. We use a stronger notion of collusion-proofness similar
to the one used in the existing literature:
Definition 1. A contract is strongly collusion-proof if there are no equilibria
where a collusive agreement is reached and the equilibrium allocation coincides
with the one that arises when both the agent and the supervisor are honest.
This definition is very restrictive as it requires that there are no equilibria
where supervisor and agent collude. Notice that in our setting this restrictive
notion comes without loss of generality as we will be able to costlessly avoid
collusion.
3.3 Collusion when the Principal Offers the Honest Contract
We begin by observing that the optimal honest contract presented in the
previous section is not strongly collusion-proof. In other words, if the principal
offers such a contract to both the supervisor and the agent, Inequality (8)
implies that in the event θS = θS2 the high productivity agent is willing to pay
at most
b = w21 − w22 > 0 (12)
to the supervisor for her to report θˆS1 while from Equation (9) the low produc-
tivity agent is not willing to pay any positive amount to the supervisor for the
same report. In the event θS = θS1 , instead, neither type of agent is willing to
pay any amount to the supervisor for changing her report.
In other words, there exists a whole set of equilibria for the collusion game
between the supervisor and the agent in which the supervisor observes the signal
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θS2 , and the high productivity agent pays a positive bribe to the supervisor to
induce him to report a low signal. These equilibria differ depending on the
size of the transfer that the high productivity agent pays to the supervisor.
Lemma 1. The honest contract is not strongly-collusion proof. Under the
honest contract, when the supervisor observes the signal θS2 , there only exist
separating equilibria of the collusion game such that: the high productivity agent
pays a positive bribe to the supervisor, β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b), the supervisor reports
θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆ
S
1 while the agent reports θˆA(θA2 ) = θA2 . The collusion designer
prescribes β(θA1 ) = 0, θˆS(θA1 ) = θˆS2 and θˆA(θA1 ) = θA1 for the low productivity
agent that does not participate in collusion.
This result shows that the supervisor and the agent may successfully engage
in collusion when the honest contract is offered to them. A critical feature of
Lemma 1 above is that all the equilibria of the collusion game are separating
equilibria: β(θA2 ) > β(θA1 ) = 0. In other words, the high productivity agent
reveals his type by participating in collusion and making a positive transfer
to the supervisor, whereas the low productivity agent does not. This implies
that, in spite of the asymmetry of information that characterizes the collusive
negotiation, the supervisor, by observing the agent’s willingness to participate
in collusion, learns the exact value of the productivity of the agent. In other
words, the existence of collusion is synonymous with the agent having high
productivity.
4 The Collusion-Proof Optimal Mechanism
In this section we propose a mechanism which allows the principal to prevent
collusion between the supervisor and the agent in a costless way: in this
mechanism the principal allows the supervisor to blow the whistle by reporting
that a collusion agreement has been reached. This report is associated with a
premium that the principal pays the supervisor that covers the penalty the
supervisor has to pay for breaching the collusive agreement. We now show that
such a promise does not involve any extra cost for the principal: it is never
carried out in equilibrium. If the high productivity agent observes this clause
of the employment contract of the supervisor, he never agrees to participate
in collusion as by doing so he loses the informational rent that he otherwise
would have gained.
4.1 Candidate Strongly Collusion-Proof Contract
When the honest contract is in place, the supervisor may observe two different
signals of the agent’s productivity: the standard signal θS ∈ ΘS and the
information possibly leaked during the collusion game. The latter takes the
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form of the agent’s truthful report in the collusion game, which, under the
honest contract, fully reveals the productivity of the agent.
It is critical for the construction of the collusion-proof contract to enlarge
the message space of the supervisor. This should allow her to report to the
principal that the agent has high productivity with certainty once she sees the
agent’s optimal strategy in the collusion game: ΘS ∪ {`A2 }, where `A2 denotes
the leaked information during the collusive game (in equilibrium this will
be interpreted as the agent having high productivity). As with every other
message, `A2 is soft or unverifiable information so it is possible that `A2 6= θA2 .
The message space of the agent is for the moment left unmodified.
We now specify the part of the strongly collusion-proof candidate contract
that concerns the employment contract of the agent. If the supervisor reports
any of the messages in ΘS and the agent reports any of the messages in ΘA
the agent’s payoffs are, as in the honest contract, characterized by the solution
to Problem (6). If the supervisor reports the new message `A2 , and the agent
reports θˆA2 we assume that the agent is asked to produce output x2, defined in
Equation (7), and is paid a wage w˜ so that:
w˜ = w¯ − κ+ d(x2 − θA2 ) (13)
where w¯ is the reservation utility, κ the penalty the supervisor pays to breach
the collusive agreement, and d(x2 − θA2 ) is his disutility of effort.
The same remuneration w˜ applies to the agent if the supervisor reports
`A2 and the agent reports θˆA1 . Also in this case the agent is asked to produce
output x2.
We now specify the collusion-proof candidate contract between the principal
and the supervisor.
If the supervisor reports any of the signals in ΘS she is paid her constant
reservation wage s¯, as in Equation (5), whatever the agent’s strategy choice.
If the supervisor reports the message `A2 and the agent reports θˆA2 the
supervisor gets her reservation salary plus a premium equal to the penalty κ
which she has to pay to breach the collusive agreement and report `A2 to the
principal:
s(`A2 , θˆ
A
2 ) = s¯+ κ, (14)
Finally, if the supervisor reports `A2 and the agent reports θˆA1 the supervisor
receives her reservation salary minus a positive punishment γ.
s(`A2 , θˆ
A
1 ) = s¯− γ, γ > 0 (15)
We impose a constraint on the size of the punishment γ so as to prevent
the supervisor from reporting `A2 if the agent does not engage in collusion.
p2 V (s¯− γ) + (1− p2)V (s¯+ κ) = V (s¯) (16)
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Table 1: Collusion-proof contract.
HHHHHHH
A’s report
S’s report
θˆA1 θˆ
A
2
`A2
θˆS1
θˆS2
CPS = [ s¯− γ ]
CPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CPS = [ s¯+ κ ]
CPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CPS = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w11, x11 ]
CPS = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w21, x21 ]
CPS = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w12, x12 ]
CPS = [ s¯ ]
CPA = [w22, x22 ]
Condition (16) implies that after observing the signal θS1
p1 V (s¯− γ) + (1− p1)V (s¯+ κ) < V (s¯) (17)
Table 1 summarizes the description of the candidate collusion-proof con-
tract CP .
Finally, recall that if we interpret the supervisor’s message `A2 as informing
the principal that collusion occurred then `A2 is equivalent to the supervisor
blowing the whistle on the existence of collusion.
4.2 Preventing Collusion
We can now show that the collusion agreement we presented in Lemma 1 above
cannot occur in any equilibrium of the supervisor and agent subgame under
the collusion-proof contract.
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Proposition 2. Assume that the principal offers the collusion-proof contract
to both the supervisor and the agent and that they both observe the signal
θS2 . There exists no equilibrium collusive agreement such that the supervisor,
after observing the signal θS2 , reports θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 while the θA2 agent makes a
transfer β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b) and reports θˆA(θA2 ) = θA2 .
The main intuition behind this result is as follows. Recall first that
according to Lemma 1 all collusive agreements between the supervisor and
the agent under the honest contract entail separating equilibria and hence the
supervisor learns the true type of the agent.24 Moreover, the collusion-proof
contract specifies payments to both the supervisor and the agent that coincide
with the honest contract whenever the supervisor reports θˆS ∈ {θS1 , θS2 }.
However, the collusion-proof contract also offers the supervisor that engaged
in collusion the option to breach the collusive agreement at no cost if the
supervisor is certain that the agent is high productivity and reports `A2 to
the principal. In the latter case the supervisor payoff is s¯ + β(θA2 ) which
coincides with her payoff if she goes along with collusion.25 The result is that
the supervisor is always compensated for breaching the collusion agreement
contract. She is thus indifferent and reports `A2 to the principal. According to
the collusion-proof contract the high productivity agent is then strictly better
off by not engaging in collusion.
The key observation is that in our framework all equilibria of the collusion
game between the supervisor and the agent reveal the exact productivity of
the agent to the supervisor. Hence, in equilibrium the supervisor has the
discretionary power to report this leaked information to the principal which in
turn discourages the agent from participating in collusion. Clearly, the same
mechanism would not be successful in preventing pooling collusive agreements
if these exist. Costly resources would then be needed to get rid of the pooling
equilibria of the collusion game — that is, using a mechanism à la Laffont and
Martimort (1997).26
24There exist only separating equilibria of the collusion game under the honest contract
because, in equilibrium, the low productivity agent is indifferent whatever the report of the
supervisor: the individual rationality constraint of the this type of agent is binding — see
Condition (9) and Lemma 1. It follows that the low productivity agent is not willing to pay
any amount to change such report. Notice that this is a rather general characteristic of a
model where collusion takes place among asymmetrically informed parties.
25The supervisor payoff is derived under the assumption that in the collusive contract
the bribe β(θA2 ) is paid upfront and is not refundable. Notice however that ακ, what the
agent receives in the event of a breach of the collusive contract on the part of the supervisor,
may well exceed the bribe paid upfront and hence be regarded as a refund of this bribe in
the event of a breach.
26Notice that similar considerations also apply when the supervisor has hard information
as in Tirole (1986). Indeed, in this case collusion only occurs between symmetrically informed
parties, hence costly resources need to be used to prevent collusion arising in equilibrium.
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Notice that the existence of any level of asymmetric information is enough
for whistle-blowing to be successful in eliminating “some” collusion. Indeed,
CP prevents collusive agreement from arising in equilibrium whatever the
precision of the signal θS2 with the exception of the limit case q1 = 1, that
is when the supervisor is perfectly informed after observing a high signal.
The following result identifies the situations in which our result on collusion-
proofness holds.
Corollary 1. No equilibrium collusive agreement, as in Lemma 1, exists for
any imperfect signal θS2 observed by the supervisor: (1− p2) < 1.
This result implies that the costs of preventing collusion are discontinuous
in the limit as the noise associated with the signal observed by the supervisor
vanishes. When the supervisor’s signal is perfect, preventing collusion becomes
costly for the principal as in Laffont and Martimort (1997). The supervisor and
the agent collude only when the supervisor perfectly observes the productivity
of the agent. Allowing the supervisor to blow the whistle is then of no use to
the principal.
It is worth observing that whistle-blowing allows the principal to prevent
collusion in a costless way when the signal θS1 is a perfect signal: when q2
converges to zero, or equivalently p1 converges to one. Collusion occurs only
when both the supervisor and the agent observe the signal θS2 , which is not
a perfect signal: the probability that the agent has low productivity is not
null, p2 > 0.27 This implies that the collusion game can still reveal some
information to the supervisor. Therefore allowing the supervisor to blow
the whistle is still effective in preventing collusion agreements between the
supervisor and the agent at no additional costs for the principal (Proposition
2 applies).
A final observation concerns the willingness of the principal to use a
supervisor. Since the solution to the collusion problem we propose is costless
for the principal, the same considerations we presented above apply in this
case. There exist values of the reservation salary of the supervisor for which
the principal has a strictly positive gain by hiring her.
27Notice that if θS1 is a perfect signal, collusion between the supervisor and the agent
will take a slightly different form even when the honest contract is offered. In fact, in such
a case there will be no need for the principal to specify a payoff for the high productivity
agent if the supervisor reports θˆS1 : the signal is perfect, so, provided the supervisor reports
the truth, the agent’s productivity is certainly low. However, it is still profitable for the
high productivity agent to bribe the supervisor to report signal θˆS1 when θ
S
2 is observed
but this report requires the agent to report θˆA1 or, equivalently, to produce a low output.
Indeed, the premium the high productivity agent receives in this way is greater than the
informational rent he would get if the supervisor reports the truth.
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5 Blackmail
5.1 The Blackmail Threat
A different type of manipulation may occur when the principal offers the
collusion-proof contract. This takes the form of blackmail. Blackmail is a
unilateral threat by one of the parties involved. For blackmail to occur in
equilibrium we require the threat to be credible. In other words, an equilibrium
of our model with blackmail is a PBE where the blackmailing party asks
for a transfer µ > 0 from the blackmailed party. If the transfer is made
then the blackmailing party complies with the equilibrium strategy in the
absence of blackmail. If the blackmailed party refuses to make the transfer
the blackmailing party behaves consistently with his/her threat.
In what follows we show that allowing the supervisor to report the informa-
tion leaked during the collusion game to the principal provides the supervisor
with the opportunity to abuse his authority and threaten the agent to report `A2 ,
even in the absence of any collusion, unless she receives a payment µ on the
part of the agent.
Assume that the principal offers the collusion-proof contract to both the
supervisor and the agent and they both accept. As from Proposition 2, what-
ever the signal θSi , the agent refuses to participate in any collusive agreement
with the supervisor. Assume now that, before reporting its observed signal,
the supervisor threatens the agent to report the signal `A2 unless she receives a
strictly positive payment µ > 0. We show below that there exist values of µ
that render this blackmail a credible threat on the part of the supervisor.
Notice first that since no collusion took place, following this threat, if both
types of agent behave in the same way, the supervisor is still uninformed on
the value of the agent’s type θAi . Therefore, Equations (16) and (17) guarantee
that under contract CP if both types of agent refuse or accept to pay µ the
supervisor reports θSi rather than `A2 . In other words the blackmail threat is
not credible.
This means that blackmail can be credible only if the two types of agent
make different choices when deciding whether or not to succumb to blackmail.
We, then, need to consider each type of agent’s willingness to go along with
the supervisor’s blackmail threat.
Consider first the θA2 agent. His maximum willingness to pay to avoid the
supervisor reporting the message `A2 is given by the difference between his
payoff if the supervisor reports the signal θSi and his payoff when she reports `A2 .
This difference is
WA2 = κ+ d(x1i − θA1 )− d(x1i − θA2 ) (18)
Consider now the θA1 agent. His maximum willingness to pay is instead
WA1 = κ+ d(x2 − θA1 )− d(x2 − θA2 ) (19)
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It then follows from the convexity of the disutility of effort, d′′(·) > 0, and
x2 > x1i that the θA1 agent is willing to pay strictly more than the θA2 agent
to avoid the supervisor reporting `A2 rather than θSi .
WA1 >WA2 (20)
This implies that the only blackmail payment µ that separates the two types
of agent is one that is acceptable to the θA1 agent but not acceptable to a θA2
agent:
WA1 > µ >WA2 (21)
Any other value of µ is either acceptable to both types of agent or not acceptable
to either type.
Notice now that if the supervisor blackmails the agent by asking for a
transfer µ satisfying Inequality (21), the supervisor following the agent decision
to pay or not µ discovers the type of the agent. In particular, following the
agent’s decision not to pay µ, the supervisor knows that the agent is of type
θA2 . It is then optimal for the supervisor to report `A2 since in so doing she
gets payoff s¯+ κ rather than the payoff s¯ she gets from reporting θSi . On the
other hand, following the agent’s decision to pay µ the supervisor knows that
the agent is of type θA1 . It is then optimal for the superior to report the signal
θSi since in so doing she gets from the principal s¯ instead of s¯− γ as from the
collusion-proof contract. In other words, the supervisor’s blackmail threat is
credible.
Lemma 2. The contract CP is vulnerable to blackmail. Under contract CP
there exists a set of equilibria such that if both types of agent and the supervisor
accept the collusion-proof contract the supervisor credibly threatens the agent
to report `A2 unless a transfer µ > 0 satisfying Inequality (21), is paid by the
agent to the supervisor.
As in the case of collusion, the reason why the supervisor’s blackmail is
credible is that if blackmail occurs it separates the two types of agents and,
as a consequence, the supervisor discovers the type of the agent and finds it
optimal to behave differently depending on whether the agent accepts or not
to pay the transfer µ.
5.2 Preventing Collusion and Blackmail
We propose here a mechanism that prevents both collusion and blackmail.
Similar to the collusion-proof contract, this mechanism now also allows the
agent to blow the whistle by enlarging his message space and allowing him
to report whether he received a blackmail threat from the supervisor. We
denote the latter message B. We first define what it means for a contract to
be blackmail-proof.
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Definition 2. A contract is blackmail-proof if all PBE of the model are such
that no party can credibly threaten any other party to deviate from the prescribed
equilibrium behavior in the absence of blackmail in exchange for a transfer
µ > 0.28
We propose a new contract, collusion and blackmail-proof (denoted CBP ),
that allows the principal to prevent, costlessly, both collusion and blackmail.
This contract enlarges the message space of both the supervisor and the agent
by allowing both to blow the whistle. It not only allows the supervisor to
report the message `A2 if collusion occurs, but also allows the agent to report
to the principal that blackmail occurred, message B, and in so doing triggers
a penalty for the supervisor that discourages her from blackmailing the agent.
Following the supervisor’s report `A2 , we allow the agent to report either
his type θˆAi or the additional message B. Notice that we restrict the agent to
report the additional message B only after the supervisor’s report of the leaked
information `A2 in order to prevent additional opportunities for manipulation
of the optimal mechanism on the part of both the supervisor and the agent.
In case the agent reports B the supervisor’s remuneration is s¯− ε, where
ε > 0 is an arbitrary small number, while the agent is asked to produce output
x2, defined in Equation (7), and is paid a wage w˜ defined in Equation (13). In
other words, the agent is indifferent between reporting any of the messages in
(θˆA1 , θˆ
A
2 ) and B while the supervisor, if she does not know the type of the agent,
is strictly worse off when the agent reports B. We summarize the contract
CBP in Table 2.
We are now in a position to show that if the principal offers contract CBP
to both the supervisor and the agent and this contract is accepted, no collusion
or blackmail takes place and the outcome coincides, on the equilibrium path,
with the honest contract above.
Proposition 3. The contract CBP is strongly collusion-proof and it is not
liable for any form of blackmail either on the part of the superior or the
agent. The PBE of the continuation game between the supervisor and the
agent coincides with the PBE of the corresponding continuation game under
the honest contract (Proposition 1).
Intuitively, allowing both the Supervisor and the Agent to blow the whistle
makes the supervisor strictly worse off by blackmailing the agent (her payoff is
s¯−ε) rather than not engaging in any threat (her payoff is s¯) because the agent
is indifferent between any report and will thus report B. In the Appendix we
also show that the message B does not introduce new opportunities for both
28Recall that in our model we assume that when indifferent, a party complies with
the strategy desired by the principal, hence blackmail is not credible if, in the subgame
following the blackmailed party decision to not pay µ, the blackmailing party is indifferent
to complying or not with the blackmail threat.
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Table 2: Collusion and blackmail-proof contract (CBP ).
HHHHHH
A’s report
S’s report
θˆA1 θˆ
A
2
`A2
θˆS1
θˆS2
CBPS = [ s¯− γ ]
CBPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CBPS = [ s¯+ κ ]
CBPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
CBPS = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w11, x11 ]
CBPS = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w21, x21 ]
CBPS = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w12, x12 ]
CBPS = [ s¯ ]
CBPA = [w22, x22 ]
B
CBPS = [ s¯− ε ]
CBPA = [ w˜, x2 ]
the supervisor and the agent to engage in collusion. It also prevents the agent
from blackmailing the supervisor with the additional message B.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have showed that potential collusion between the intermediate
and bottom layers of a hierarchy might make it desirable for the principal
to allow his subordinates to blow the whistle. In other words, the principal,
allowing the supervisor to blow the whistle on whether collusion occurred, aligns
the objectives of the supervisor with her own and eliminates the opportunity of
collusive behavior between layers and, ultimately, enhances efficiency. However,
allowing the supervisor to blow the whistle introduces the opportunity for the
supervisor to blackmail the agent. Once again, allowing this time the agent to
blow the whistle on the existence of blackmail prevents any wrongdoing and
replicates the honest outcome.
At the core of our argument is the idea that in many collusive agreements or
blackmail interactions some information is shared between collusive parties and
this information can subsequently be used to the detriment of the collusive par-
ties or the blackmailer. In such circumstances the principal (residual claimant
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in our setting) could appropriately reward the leaking of such information and
in this manner avoid collusive agreements and blackmail threats.
In principle, one could apply this same logic to the contract the principal
writes with the agent. Indeed, the direct mechanism we have analyzed specifies
that the agent and supervisor report their private information to the principal
and only at a later stage can the agent exert her productive effort. In principle,
one could argue that the principal could use the information revealed by the
agent and renege on the promised output-contingent remuneration before
output is realized. Notice however, that this multistage performance on the
part of the agent only applies to the direct revelation mechanism. The most
obvious indirect mechanism would have the agent, after the supervisor’s report,
exert a productive effort that leads to the observed output. In other words,
the agent’s private information is only revealed when production is completed.
Assuming that the principal can renege on a promise at this stage would be
equivalent to assuming that simple trade cannot be enforced. This lack of
commitment clearly opens up further sources of inefficiency in usual contracting
environments that are beyond the scope of this paper. We should add that it
is sensible to assume that contracts written by the principal can be enforced
by a Court of Law while the same cannot be said of side contracts. Our
paper should then be read as a first step in the direction of explicitly allowing
contracting parties to breach their signed agreements.
Finally, our analysis sheds light on the use of rules versus discretion in the
designing of the optimal degree of decision power of members of an organization.
Tirole (1986) argues that fixed rules as opposed to discretion might be used to
reduce patterns of collusive behavior in large (private or public) organizations.
In this paper we show that whenever collusion takes place in conditions of
asymmetric information, an increase in the discretionary power (the message
space) of intermediate layers of the organization as emphasised in McCubbins
and Schwartz (1984), may have a beneficial effect in reducing the possibility
of both collusion and blackmail.
The results presented in this paper can be interpreted as a way to implement
a particular outcome that enlarges the strategy space of subordinates. The basic
intuition is as follows.29 We have learned from the literature on commitment
that under certain conditions a player can increase his welfare whilst restricting,
in a credible way, his choices: his strategy space.30 This paper complements
this literature by showing that enlarging the strategy space of members of
an organization (i.e. delegating oversight activities to them) enhances the
welfare of the residual claimant of an activity whilst reducing the welfare of
his subordinate.
29We are indebted to David Canning for this intuition.
30See for example Laffont and Tirole (1988).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Assume that the honest contract binds the principal, the supervisor and
the agent. Assume that S observes the signal θS2 . The collusion contracts
C = {β(θA1 ), β(θA2 ); θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 , θˆS(θA2 ) = θˆS2 }, such that β(θA1 ) = 0, β(θA2 ) ∈
(0, b) — with b as in Equation (12) — and S reports θˆS1 if the agent reports
θA2 to the collusion designer and θˆS2 if the agent reports θA1 to the collusion
designer, satisfies the collusion-game incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints for the θA2 agent but does not satisfy the collusion-game
individual rationality constraint for the θA1 agent.
Consider first the collusion game incentive compatibility constraint for the
θA2 agent
w21 − β(θA2 )− d(x2 − θA2 ) ≥ w12 − β(θA1 )− d(x12 − θA2 )
= w22 − β(θA1 )− d(x2 − θA2 ) (A.1)
Equations (8) and (12), together with 0 < β(θA2 ) < b and β(θA1 ) = 0, imply
that Condition (A.1) holds with a strict inequality.31 Consider now the
collusion-game individual rationality constraint for the θA2 agent:
w21 − β(θA2 )− d(x2 − θA2 ) ≥ w22 − d(x2 − θA2 ) (A.2)
Equations (8), (12) together with 0 < β(θA2 ) < b imply that Condition (A.2)
also holds with a strict inequality. The collusion-game individual rationality
constraint for the θA1 agent is instead:
w12 − β(θA1 )− d(x12 − θA1 ) ≥ w12 − d(x12 − θA1 ) (A.3)
From β(θA1 ) = 0 it follows that Condition (A.3) holds with equality. This
means that the θA1 agent does not participate in the collusion game since, when
indifferent, the agent does what the principal would like him to do.32
Consider now the supervisor’s collusion-game individual rationality con-
straint associated with the collusion contract C. This is:
ν V (s¯) + (1− ν)V (s¯+ β(θA2 )) ≥ V (s¯) (A.4)
where ν denotes the supervisor’s beliefs at the collusion stage that the type of
the agent is θA1 . Clearly, if ν < 1 and β(θA2 ) > 0 Constraint (A.4) is satisfied
with a strict inequality. In other words, under the honest contract it is an
equilibrium of the collusion game for both the type θA2 agent and the supervisor
to accept any of the collusion contracts C.
31Notice that Equation (11) and β(θA1 ) = 0 imply that, following the deviation of the θ
A
2
agent in the report to the collusion designer, this agent will be indifferent when making his
report to the principal and hence will report the truth.
32Notice that a similar argument shows that neither the θA1 agent nor the θ
A
2 participate
in collusion if the contract C is such that β(θA2 ) = b.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Assume that the supervisor observes the signal θS2 . Consider any incentive
compatible collusive contract such that the supervisor reports θS(θA2 ) = θˆS1
and the θA2 agent pays the bribe β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b), as in Equation (12). We
proceed in four steps.
Step 1. The agent always reports the truth to the principal whatever his
productivity and the outcome of the collusion game.
We start from the high productivity agent. Assume that the θA2 agent
participates in collusion and the collusion contract is not breached by the
supervisor this agent’s payoff is then either w21 − β(θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA2 ), if he
reports the truth, or w11 − β(θA2 )− d(x11 − θA2 ), if he does not. Equation (10)
implies that the agent is indifferent between these two payoffs, hence he reports
the truth. Assume next that the θA2 agent participates in collusion and the
collusion contract is breached by the supervisor who reports the message `A2 .
This agent’s payoff is then w˜−β(θA2 )+ακ−d(x2−θA2 ) = w¯−β(θA2 )− (1−α)κ
whether he reports the truth or he does not. Hence, the agent, being indifferent,
reports the truth.
Assume now that the θA2 agent does not participate in collusion. If the
supervisor reports the observed signal θS2 , the binding incentive compatibility
constraint for the high productivity agent, Equation (11), implies that the
agent reports the truth. If instead the supervisor reports the additional signal
`A2 the agent’s payoff is w˜ − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯ − κ whether he reports the truth
or he does not. Hence, the high productivity agent is indifferent and reports
the truth.
Consider, now, the low productivity agent. Assume that the θA1 agent
participates in collusion and the supervisor does not breach the collusive
agreement and reports the signal θˆS1 , the agent’s payoff is w¯ − β(θA1 ) if he
reports θˆA1 and w21− β(θA1 )− d(x2− θA1 ) < w¯− β(θA1 ) if he reports θˆA2 . Hence
the agent will report the truth. Conversely, assume that the θA1 agent does not
participate in collusion and the supervisor reports the observed signal θˆS2 . The
incentive compatibility constraint for the low productivity agent — implied by
θA2 > θ
A
1 and Equation (11) — holds with strict inequality, hence the agent
reports the truth.
Finally, assume the supervisor reports the message `A2 , the agent’s payoff
is the same whatever his report. It is either w˜ − β(θA1 ) + ακ− d(x2 − θA1 ) =
w¯− β(θA1 )− (1−α)κ+ d(x2− θA2 )− d(x2− θA1 ), if the supervisor participated
in collusion, breaches the collusion contract and reports the message `A2 or is
w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − κ+ d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θA1 ) if she reports the message
`A2 without participating in collusion. Either case, the agent, being indifferent,
reports the truth.
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Step 2. Derivation of the supervisor’s best response when the supervisor
observes θS2 .
As above, denote ν the supervisor’s belief that the agent is of type θA1 at
the collusion stage. Assume, first, that both the agent and the supervisor
accept to participate in collusion. The supervisor’s payoff is then V (s¯+β(θA2 ))
if she complies with the collusion contract and reports θS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 . The
supervisor expected payoff is instead νV (s¯+β(θA2 )−γ−κ)+(1−ν)V (s¯+β(θA2 ))
if she breaches the collusion contract and reports the additional signal `A2 .
Equation (14) implies that if ν > 0 the former option yields a higher payoff to
the supervisor, hence she will comply with the collusion contract. If, instead,
ν = 0 the supervisor is indifferent between the two options, hence she acts in
the way most preferred by the principal: she breaches the collusion contract
and reports the signal `A2 to the principal.
Consider now the supervisor decision whether to participate in the collusion
game. As seen above her payoff, whether she breaches the collusion contract or
not, is V (s¯+β(θA2 )) while her payoff is V (s¯) if she refuses to participate in the
collusion game and reports the observed signal θˆS2 . Clearly, if β(θA2 ) > 0 the
supervisor is better off accepting to participate in collusion. Only if β(θA2 ) = 0
the supervisor is indifferent and refuses to participate in the collusion game.
Step 3. The value of the supervisor’s belief ν = 0 is the only one consistent
with the low productivity agent’s behavior.
Assume ν > 0 and consider the behavior of the low productivity agent.
Given the supervisor’s best response, Step 2, the agent’s payoff is either
w¯ − β(θA1 ), if he participates in the collusion game, or w¯, if he does not.
Clearly the low productivity agent always refuses to participate in the collusion
game for β(θA1 ) ≥ 0. This contradicts the hypothesis ν > 0.
Step 4. The agent always refuses to participate in the collusion game whatever
his productivity.
We start from the low productivity agent. Given Steps 2 and 3, the agent’s
payoff is w˜ + ακ − d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − (1 − α)κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ) if
he participates in the collusion game and produces output x2. Such payoff is
strictly lower than the agent’s reservation wage w¯ since θA1 < θA2 . Conversely,
if the agent refuses to participate in the collusion game his payoff is w¯, by
Equation (9). Hence, the low productivity agent refuses to participate in the
collusion game.
Finally, consider the high productivity agent. Steps 1, 2 and 3 imply
that if he accepts the collusive offer his payoff is w˜ − β(θA2 ) + ακ − d(x2 −
θA2 ) = w¯ − β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ. Conversely, if he rejects the collusive offer his
payoff is w22 − d(x22 − θA2 ) which, by Equation (8), is strictly greater than
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w¯−β(θA2 )− (1−α)κ. Hence, the high productivity agent refuses to participate
in the collusion game.
Proof of Corollary 1:
The proof follows immediately from the observation that the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 does not rely on how precise the signal θS2 is of the agent being of type
θA2 but only on whether, having observed signal θS2 there still exists a residual,
strictly positive, probability that the agent is of type θA1 .
Proposition 3 will be proved with the assistance of the following four
lemmas:
Lemma 3. The contract CBP is such that, in the absence of collusion, any
blackmail threat on the part of S is not credible.
Proof. Assume S threatens A to report `A2 unless she receives a transfer µ > 0
from A. Notice, first, that following S’s report `A2 , A is indifferent and hence
by assumption he reports B to P .
Assume now that while the type θA1 of A pays µ > 0 type θA2 of A does
not. Following A’s decision not to pay, S’s payoff is V (s¯− ε) if S reports `A2
and V (s¯) if S reports θSi . Therefore, S reports θSi and hence S’s threat is not
credible.
Assume now that while the type θA1 of A does not pay µ > 0 type θA2 of A
does. Following A’s decision not to pay, S’s payoff is V (s¯− ε) if S reports `A2
and V (s¯) if S reports θSi . Once again, S reports θSi and hence S’s threat is
not credible.
Assume now that both types of A pay µ > 0. Following type θA2 of A’s
deviation not to pay, S’s payoff is V (s¯−ε) if S reports `A2 and V (s¯) if S reports
θSi whatever S’s beliefs. Once again, S reports θSi and hence S’s threat is not
credible.
Finally, consider the case where both types of A do not pay µ > 0. S’s
payoff is V (s¯− ε) if S reports `A2 and V (s¯) if S reports θSi . In other words, S
reports θSi and S’s threat is not credible.
Lemma 4. The contract CBP is such that, in the absence of collusion, any
blackmail threat on the part of A is not credible.
Proof. Assume that, in the absence of any threat on the part of S, A threatens
S to report B following S’s report `A2 unless he receives a transfer η > 0 from S.
Consider first the case in which the type θA1 of A threatens S while the
type θA2 of A does not. Following A’s threat, S updates her beliefs that A is of
type θA1 . S’s payoff if she reports θSi is V (s¯) if S does not pay and V (s¯− η) if
she pays. S’s payoff if she reports `A2 depends on A’s report. Notice, however,
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that A’s payoff is the same whatever his report. In particular, A’s payoff is
w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ) if S does not pay and
w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) + η = w¯ − κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ) + η if S pays. In
either case, A is indifferent among his messages and hence reports the truth
θA1 . Given this report, S’s payoff is then V (s¯ − γ) if she does not pay and
V (s¯− γ − η) if she pays. This implies that S’s optimal strategy is not to pay
η and to report θSi while A’s optimal strategy is to report θA1 . In other words,
A’s threat is not credible.
Consider next the case in which the type θA1 of A does not threaten S
while the type θA2 of A does. Following A’s threat, S updates her beliefs that
A is of type θA2 . S’s payoff if she reports θSi is V (s¯) if S does not pay and
V (s¯− η) if she pays. Once again S’s payoff if she reports `A2 depends on A’s
report. Notice, however, that as above A’s payoff is the same whatever his
report. In particular, A’s payoff is w˜ − d(x2 − θA2 ) = w¯ − κ if S does not pay
and w˜ − d(x2 − θA2 ) + η = w¯ − κ+ η if S pays. In either case, A is indifferent
among his messages and hence reports the truth θA2 . Given this report S’s
payoff is then V (s¯+ κ) if she does not pay and V (s¯+ κ− η) if she pays. This
implies that S’s optimal strategy is not to pay η and to report `A2 while A’s
optimal strategy is to report θA2 . Once again, A’s threat is not credible.
Finally, consider the case in which both types of A threaten S. Following
A’s threat, S does not update her beliefs. Now S’s payoff if she reports θSi
is V (s¯) if S does not pay and V (s¯ − η) if she pays. Once again S’s payoff
if she reports `A2 depends on A’s report. Notice, however, that as above A’s
payoff is the same whatever his report. In particular, type θAj , j ∈ {1, 2}, of
A’s payoff is w˜ − d(x2 − θAj ) = w¯ − κ+ d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θAj ) if S does not
pay and w˜ − d(x2 − θAj ) + η = w¯ − κ+ d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θAj ) + η if S pays.
In either case, A is indifferent among his messages and hence reports the truth
θAj . Given this report by Conditions (16) and (17) S’s payoff is smaller than
V (s¯) if she does not pay and smaller than V (s¯− η) if she pays. This implies
that S’s optimal strategy is not to pay η and to report θSi while A’s optimal
strategy is to report θAj . Once again, A’s threat is not credible.
Lemma 5. The contract CBP is such that, if the supervisor observes the signal
θS2 , there exists no equilibrium collusive agreement such that the supervisor,
after observing the signal θS2 , reports the message θS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 and the θA2
agent makes a transfer β(θA2 ) ∈ (0, b), as from Equation (12).
Proof. Assume the supervisor observes the signal θS2 . We proceed in four steps.
Step 1. The agent always reports the truth to the principal whatever his
productivity and the outcome of the collusion game.
We start from the high productivity agent. Assume that the θA2 agent
participates in collusion and the collusion contract is not breached by the
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supervisor this agent’s payoff is then either w21 − β(θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA2 ), if he
reports the truth, or w11 − β(θA2 )− d(x11 − θA2 ), if he does not. Equation (10)
implies that the agent is indifferent between these two payoffs, hence he reports
the truth. Assume next that the θA2 agent participates in collusion and the
collusion contract is breached by the supervisor who reports the message `A2 .
This agent’s payoff is then w¯− β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ whether he reports θˆA2 , θˆA2 or
B. Hence, the agent, being indifferent, reports the truth.
Assume now that the θA2 agent does not participate in collusion. If the
supervisor reports the observed signal θS2 , the binding incentive compatibility
constraint for the high productivity agent, Equation (11), implies that the
agent reports the truth. If instead the supervisor reports the additional signal
`A2 the agent’s payoff is w¯ − κ whether he reports θˆA2 , θˆA2 or B. Once again,
the high productivity agent being indifferent reports the truth.
Consider, now, the low productivity agent. Assume that the θA1 agent
participates in collusion and the supervisor does not breach the collusive
agreement and reports the signal θˆS1 , the agent’s payoff is w¯ − β(θA1 ) if he
reports θˆA1 and w21− β(θA1 )− d(x2− θA1 ) < w¯− β(θA1 ) if he reports θˆA2 . Hence
the agent will report the truth. Conversely, assume that the θA1 agent does not
participate in collusion and the supervisor reports the observed signal θˆS2 . The
incentive compatibility constraint for the low productivity agent — implied by
θA2 > θ
A
1 and Equation (11) — holds with strict inequality, hence the agent
reports the truth. Finally, assume the supervisor reports the additional signal
`A2 , the agent’s payoff is the same whether he reports θˆA2 , θˆA2 or B. It is either
w˜−β(θA1 ) +ακ−d(x2−θA1 ) = w¯−β(θA1 )− (1−α)κ+d(x2−θA2 )−d(x2−θA1 ),
if the supervisor participated in collusion, breaches the collusion contract and
reports the message `A2 or is w˜− d(x2− θA1 ) = w¯−κ+ d(x2− θA2 )− d(x2− θA1 )
if she reports the message `A2 without participating in collusion. Either case,
the agent, being indifferent, reports the truth.
Step 2. Derivation of the supervisor’s best response when the supervisor
observes θS2 and does not blackmail the agent.
Once again, denote ν the supervisor’s belief that the agent is of type θA1
at the collusion stage. Assume, first, that both the agent and the supervisor
accept to participate in collusion. The supervisor’s payoff is then V (s¯+β(θA2 ))
if she complies with the collusion contract and reports θS(θA2 ) = θˆS1 . The
supervisor expected payoff is instead νV (s¯+β(θA2 )−γ−κ)+(1−ν)V (s¯+β(θA2 ))
if she breaches the collusion contract and reports the additional signal `A2 .
Equation (14) implies that if ν > 0 the former option yields a higher payoff to
the supervisor, hence she will comply with the collusion contract. If, instead,
ν = 0 the supervisor is indifferent between the two options, hence she acts in
the way most preferred by the principal: she breaches the collusion contract
and reports the signal `A2 to the principal.
Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing 309
Consider now the supervisor decision whether to participate in the collusion
game. As seen above her payoff, whether she breaches the collusion contract or
not, is V (s¯+β(θA2 )) while her payoff is V (s¯) if she refuses to participate in the
collusion game and reports the observed signal θˆS2 . Clearly, if β(θA2 ) > 0 the
supervisor is better off accepting to participate in collusion. Only if β(θA2 ) = 0
the supervisor is indifferent and refuses to participate in the collusion game.
Step 3. If collusion occurs the value of the supervisor’s belief ν = 0 is the
only one consistent with the low productivity agent’s behavior.
Assume ν > 0 and consider the behavior of the low productivity agent.
Given the supervisor’s best response, Step 2, the agent’s payoff is either
w¯ − β(θA1 ), if he participates in the collusion game, or w¯, if he does not.
Clearly the low productivity agent always refuses to participate in the collusive
for β(θA1 ) ≥ 0. This contradicts the hypothesis ν > 0.
Step 4. The agent always refuses to participate in the collusion game whatever
his productivity.
We start from the low productivity agent. Given Steps 2 and 3, the agent’s
payoff is w˜ + ακ − d(x2 − θA1 ) = w¯ − (1 − α)κ + d(x2 − θA2 ) − d(x2 − θA1 ) if
he participates in the collusion game and produces output x2. Such payoff is
strictly lower than the agent’s reservation wage w¯ since θA1 < θA2 . Conversely,
if the agent refuses to participate in the collusion game his payoff is w¯, by
Equation (9). Hence, the low productivity agent refuses to participate in the
collusion game.
Finally, consider the high productivity agent. Steps 1, 2 and 3 imply
that if he accepts the collusive offer his payoff is w˜ − β(θA2 ) + ακ − d(x2 −
θA2 ) = w¯ − β(θA2 )− (1− α)κ. Conversely, if he rejects the collusive offer his
payoff is w22 − d(x22 − θA2 ) which, by Equation (8), is strictly greater than
w¯−β(θA2 )− (1−α)κ. Hence, the high productivity agent refuses to participate
in the collusion game.
Lemma 6. The contract CBP is such that there exists no equilibrium collusive
agreement where:
(i) The supervisor reports the message θˆS(θA1 ) = θˆS(θA2 ) = `A2 , the agent
reports θˆA(θA1 ) = θˆA(θA2 ) = θˆA2 and the supervisor pays ξ ∈ (0, κ) to the agent.
(ii) The supervisor reports the message θˆS(θA2 ) = `A2 , the θA2 agent reports
θˆA(θA2 ) = θ
A
2 and the supervisor pays ξ ∈ (0, κ) to this type of agent. The θA1
agent does not participate in collusion.
Proof. Consider first the collusive agreement described in (i) above: θˆS(θA1 ) =
θˆS(θA2 ) = `
A
2 , θˆA(θA1 ) = θˆA(θA2 ) = θˆA2 and the supervisor pays ξ ∈ (0, κ) to the
agent. The θA1 agent’s highest payoff (ξ = κ) if he participates in collusion is
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w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) + κ = w¯ + d(x2 − θA2 )− d(x2 − θA1 ) < w¯. Hence, the θA1 agent
does not participate in such a collusion agreement since he can guarantee
himself a payoff of w¯ by doing so.
Consider now the collusive agreement described in (ii) above: θˆS(θA2 ) = `A2 ,
θˆA(θA2 ) = θ
A
2 , the supervisor pays ξ ∈ (0, κ) to the θA2 agent and the θA1 agent
does not participate in collusion. The θA2 agent’s highest payoff (ξ = κ) if he
participates in collusion is w˜ − d(x2 − θA1 ) + κ = w¯. This implies that the θA2
agent does not participate in such a collusion agreement since he can guarantee
himself the same payoff of w¯ by doing so.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Notice that given contract CBP there only exist gains-from-trade from collu-
sion in two separate instances. When S observes θS2 the type θA2 of A is willing
to pay up to b as in Condition (12) for S to report θˆS1 rather than θˆS2 . When
S reports message `A2 she is willing to pay up to the amount κ for the agent
to report θˆA2 rather than θˆA1 or B.33
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 show that neither type of collusion may occur in
any equilibrium of our model under contract CBP . In the absence of collusion,
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 show that under contract CBP no blackmail on the
part of the agent or of the supervisor will occur in equilibrium. It then follows
that, under contract CBP , all the PBE of the continuation game between
the supervisor and the agent coincides with the PBE of the corresponding
continuation game under the honest contract.
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